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13. Excess debt and asset deflation
Jan Toporowski
INTRODUCTION: THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC 
THEORY
The financial crisis that is spreading out from countries with the most 
‘advanced’ financial systems to the rest of the world has not been well 
served by economic theory. That is to say, economic theories did not, as 
they should, prepare policy- makers and practitioners for the crisis, and 
few theorists have been able to illuminate the course of the crisis and its 
implications with anything other than the insights that had conspicuously 
failed to prepare us for such a crisis.
In the mainstream, new classical economics has modelled a very attenu-
ated financial system, driven by ‘rational’ individuals exchanging real 
resources to obtain such allocations in general equilibrium that maxi-
mize utility functions now and over time. Disturbances arise because of 
unanticipated ‘shocks’, following which general equilibrium is resumed. 
This unworldly philosophy ignores the very apparent macroeconomic 
imbalances that built up over many years (and therefore can hardly be 
described as ‘unanticipated shocks’) and that are now working themselves 
in the deflation of economies. However, it still plays a very real part in the 
thinking of policy- makers. Their general equilibrium models still reassure 
us that what is clearly emerging as a lengthy deflationary process is a tem-
porary response to the shock of bank defaults, and that stable growth will 
be shortly resumed (Bank of England, 2008).
The new Keynesians have also been intellectually hamstrung by a 
methodological addiction to general equilibrium. This was used to model 
underemployment equilibria due to market ‘rigidities’. The more dynamic 
‘financial accelerator’ model has a credit cycle driven by fluctuations in net 
wealth. However, this is still within a general equilibrium framework and 
with little explanation of the financial mechanics that have now broken 
down. Such mechanics are replaced by arbitrary constraints and lags 
imposed on the general equilibrium model, in order to generate a cycle 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Among behavioural economists Robert 
Shiller stands out for his embrace of what he regards as more realistic 
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financial economics that rejects ‘realism’, i.e. the notion that monetary and 
financial relations are a mere veil over real economic relations.
Outside the mainstream, post- Keynesians have traditionally emphasized 
low growth and high unemployment as consequences of the departure from 
‘Keynesian policies’, which range from cheap money to fiscal activism 
(Coddington, 1983; Tily, 2007; Chick, 1973: ch. 8). For post- Keynesians, 
almost without exception, instability arises out of some combination of 
speculation and financial deregulation (e.g. Kregel, 2008; Wray, 2008). 
Over the years since post- Keynesianism emerged in the 1970s, its partisans 
have had one major methodological advantage over new classical and new 
Keynesian economists, namely the post- Keynesians’ rejection of general 
equilibrium. This advantage is now apparent, but that was of precious 
little benefit to post- Keynesians in the meantime and led to their being cast 
out of the mainstream. The rejection of general equilibrium inspired post-
 Keynesians to embrace an approach to financial market dynamics that 
I describe below as ‘market process’. Within this, post- Keynesians have 
emphasized the generation of economic disequilibrium because of uncer-
tainty, perverse or fluctuating expectations, highlighting in particular the 
role of speculation in financial markets as a factor in capitalizt instability.
Outside the mainstream have also been old Keynesians critics of 
financial markets, such as Charles P. Kindleberger and John Kenneth 
Galbraith. Their economic- historical approach to their subject, rejection 
of the scientific pretensions of modern quantitative finance theory, and 
doom- laden forecasts as the markets rose caused their ideas to be margin-
alized in their senior stratum of their profession.
The present crisis has not dealt kindly with any of these schools of 
thought. The principal flaws have not been either a devotion to the effi-
ciency of financial markets, or a belief in the inefficiency of those markets, 
since the former was, superficially at least, right through the long financial 
boom, and the latter is quite clearly right in the current crisis.
Perhaps the greatest casualties have been suffered by new classical 
ideas. The attenuated view of financial markets put forward by their most 
mathematically sophisticated exponents such as Michael Woodford has 
left them with little in the way of diagnostic equipment to bring to the 
analysis of the crisis. The equilibrium business cycle idea that real econo-
mies are briefly disturbed by ‘shocks’ is clearly inconsistent with not only 
the long- term structural disequilibria, most notably the macroeconomic 
imbalances of the USA, that preceded the crisis, but also the deflation now 
unfolding in the world economy.
The new Keynesian approach, focusing on information asymmetries, is 
also unsuitable for dealing with long- term imbalances. At best it produced 
a financial cycle based on ad hoc lags and restrictions. For all of their 
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claimed insight into credit market operations, new Keynesians offer little 
in the way of a theory of credit or liquidity, other than a balance sheet of 
net wealth, that is supposed to respond to changing financial conditions by 
inflating or deflating the economy. Their cousins, the behavioural finance 
school, have the disadvantage of being led by someone whose touching 
faith in the ability of futures markets to secure us against all economic dis-
asters, and is dramatically out of tune with what we now know about the 
risk- reducing efficiency of financial derivatives (Shiller, 1993).
The ‘old Keynesians’ of Kindleberger and Galbraith seem to be amply 
vindicated by the events of the crisis. Their accounts of greed, enrichment 
through financial manipulations, the hubris of finance leading to the 
nemesis of depression, cannot be read without evoking vivid parallels with 
our times. Nevertheless, their insights, however profound, do not add up 
to a systematic analysis, in the sense of laying out the market mechanisms 
by which financial markets are inflated and then deflated. In the final 
analysis, attributing financial boom and collapse to some nebulous ‘confi-
dence’, or ‘euphoria’ followed by a ‘loss of confidence’, or ‘panic’ reduces 
experience to perceptions of that experience, rather than explaining events 
(cf. ‘Bagehot’s Lombard Street is the psychology of finance, not the theory 
of it’: Keynes, 1915).
Related considerations apply to post- Keynesian accounts of the crisis, 
attributing it to either speculation or deregulation. The post- Keynesian 
view, as indicated above, is firmly rooted in the market process in the finan-
cial markets. However, it provides for weak accounts of business cycles. In 
the version put forward by Keynes and Kaldor, speculation and volatile 
expectations are permanent conditions of financial markets (Keynes, 1936: 
ch. 12, Kaldor, 1939). They may provide an explanation of economic or 
financial instability, in the sense of something approaching stochastic 
changes in output and financial variables, but something more is needed 
to account for extended financial booms and collapses. As for deregula-
tion as a factor in the financial crisis, it may be a necessary condition of 
the crisis, but it is not a sufficient one. The major dismantling of financial 
regulations in the USA and the UK took place in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
By the 1990s it was virtually complete. Yet it took another decade and a 
half for the deregulated edifice to collapse. If anything, this would suggest 
that deregulation provided the economy with a stable boom, rather than 
financial disorder. An additional complication in the post- Keynesian case, 
perhaps, is that Keynes himself opposed ‘Schachtian’ policies of financial 
regulation except in the international monetary sphere.
The crisis has also provided some vindication of the views of Marxists 
and institutionalist followers of Veblen, whose analyses of capitalizm 
rested to some extent at least on the immanence of its failure. We now 
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know much more about the financial theories of Marx and Veblen, and 
can marvel at the sophistication of their analysis and even their antici-
pations of certain aspects of twenty- first- century financial capitalizm. 
However, by clinging to the original observations of those masters, their 
followers today have been unable to develop any theory of money and 
finance for modern financial capitalizm that can provide insights to match 
or even go beyond those of Keynes, Kalecki, Steindl and Minsky.
The laurels for anticipating the crisis must assuredly go to Hyman 
P. Minsky, the leading late twentieth- century exponent of the inherent 
instability of modern financial capitalizm. In his work, more than in 
that of any other economist, may be found the essential ideas and con-
cepts that are necessary to understand the generation of the crisis and its 
consequences. The flaws in his work arise not because his insights were 
incorrect but because, put together into a systematic analysis, they contain 
inconsistencies in monetary analysis (see Toporowski, 2008). Central to 
Minsky’s explanation of crisis is the emergence of over- indebtedness in 
the economy, i.e. excessive debt in relation to the income that is supposed 
to service it. This he drew from the debt- deflation theory of Irving Fisher 
(Fisher, 1933). However, over- indebtedness is difficult to reconcile with 
the boom in equity financing since the 1980s, and in the years preceding 
the 1929 Crash. By all accounts equity financing is a stabilizing feature of 
financial systems rather than a destabilizing one (‘the greater the weight of 
equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the likelihood that the 
unit is a hedge financing unit’: Minsky, 1992: 7).
In general, the financial crisis, like the 1929 Crash and the Great 
Depression that succeeded it, has confounded general equilibrium theo-
rists and justified those critics of capitalizm who view the system as prone 
to crisis. But if the crisis reveals the credulity of general equilibrium theo-
rists, the catastrophists have an equivalent defect in their argument. This 
is in their failure to explain the relative stability of financial capitalizm in 
the decades before the crisis, with only peripheral, if no less catastrophic 
for the markets concerned, crises up to 2007. Monetarists have sought to 
explain this stability and subsequent collapse by attributing it to loose 
monetary policy before a tightening in 2007–08. This view has two flaws. 
In the first place, monetary policy was hardly loose in the countries now 
most affected by the crisis, such as the UK. More importantly, monetar-
ists never put forward financial crisis as a possible consequence of loose 
monetary policy. In their view, loose monetary policy was supposed to 
generate inflation in wages and product markets, rather than in the finan-
cial markets. The absence of such wage and product market inflation prior 
to the crisis is an inconsistency in the monetarist explanation.
In sum, economists have failed to predict the crisis and those who now 
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claim to have predicted it failed to predict the extent of the boom that 
preceded it. This chapter presents an explanation of the crisis rooted in a 
theory of financial inflation that has injected excess debt into the economy. 
The next section looks at some of the methodological issues in credit cycle 
analysis. A further section presents an explanation of the crisis using ele-
ments of Minsky and my own theory of capital market inflation. The final 
section considers some distributional aspects of financial inflation and 
crisis.
THREE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES
It is perhaps natural that, in a situation of largely unanticipated financial 
crisis (unanticipated in a new classical sense that, had market participants 
anticipated the crisis, then they would have hedged or insured against it 
and the crisis would not have occurred), questions have been raised about 
the role of risk models and recently even of the macroeconomic models 
that the Bank of England uses as a guide to policy. In those models it 
has increasingly been accepted, in line with the new classical approach 
to macroeconomic dynamics, that changes in variables over time are 
responses to shocks or stochastic disturbances, i.e. random events with a 
known probability distribution, affecting a system that starts in general 
equilibrium, and then reverts to a different general equilibrium. This may 
be contrasted with an older tradition in economic analysis attributing 
catastrophic economic events to particular market processes, perhaps 
most famously described in Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics and Crashes 
(Kindleberger, 1989). Early on in his work Minsky made clear that he 
regarded theories that give no account of market process as defective 
(Toporowski, 2008).
The two analytical approaches are not necessarily incompatible, since 
the outcomes of market processes, such as prices, may be modelled as 
variables exhibiting particular kinds of distribution. However, the two 
approaches are certainly not equivalent, at least not for policy- makers. 
While stochastic disturbance modelling provides satisfying simulations 
of crises, and even pre- crisis anticipations of crisis, the hallmark of any 
actual financial crisis is an inability to clear complex translations between 
assets and liabilities that were previously settled in a routine way. In 
such a situation, an awareness that particular incidents have a stochastic 
distribution is not very helpful to those responsible for clearing up the 
mess. Unravelling those complex translations, in order to clear payments 
and settle liabilities, and setting up new transactions routines requires a 
careful analysis of actual market processes. This abstraction of stochastic 
M2051 - KATES PRINT.indd   225 27/10/09   15:01:08
226 Macroeconomic theory and its failings
GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:12037 - EE - KATES:M2051 - KATES PRINT GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:12037 - EE - KATES:M2051 - KATES PRINT
modelling from really existing situations is what Marx had in mind when, 
discussing ‘abstract forms of crisis’, he observed:
how insipid the economists are who, when they are no longer able to explain 
away the phenomenon of over- production and crises, are content to say that 
these forms contain the possibility of crises, and that it is therefore accidental 
whether or not crises occur and consequently their occurrence is itself merely a 
matter of chance. (Marx, 1975: 512)
There is, moreover, another serious deficiency of the stochastic distur-
bance or ‘shock’ approach. This is that such shocks and the apparently 
dynamic (because they occur over time) adjustments to which they give 
rise are inevitably transitory before market- clearing general equilibrium is 
restored. In practice, as we are now much more aware, the structural shift 
that has occurred with the financial crisis is an outcome of much more 
deep- rooted and sustained macroeconomic imbalances. These have been 
most apparent in the USA, where the trade and fiscal deficits have been 
widening for nearly ten years. In China, the investment boom that is now 
coming to an end has been sustained for nearly 30 years. These are there-
fore very persistent ‘shocks’ and those who think in new classical business 
cycle terms need more than just vague allusions to generic market rigidities 
to explain their persistence. Moreover, in the present economic situation 
any new classical economists who may believe that a new market- clearing 
general equilibrium is emerging are, I think, very much mistaken or are 
using the notion of market- clearing (which includes full employment) 
rather loosely.
The approach to financial crisis that regards it as a structural shift 
following an extended period of expanding disequilibria, followed by a 
new period of extended imbalances, most notably in the labour market, 
suggests a different way of analysing financial crisis. This would be by 
examining the mechanisms by which macroeconomic imbalances were 
accommodated over the initial period. (Such mechanisms, for example, 
were provided in the period before the crisis by a process of what I have 
called capital market inflation: Toporowski, 2000: Part 1.) The analysis of 
crisis can then move on to examining the reasons why those accommodat-
ing mechanisms broke down and thereby precipitated the crisis. The sub-
sequent economic decline can then be examined by regarding that decline 
as an outcome of a new set of macroeconomic imbalances reinforced by 
mechanisms generated in the crisis (see, e.g., Perelstein, 2009).
In the next section, I present my own view of how long- term structural 
imbalances were accommodated by the financial markets through stabiliz-
ing mechanisms that broke down in the months preceding the outbreak of 
the crisis in 2007.
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INFLATING THE CREDIT MARKETS
The account of corporate borrowing that is put forward by virtually all 
schools of thought in economics presents it as a ‘voluntary’ phenomenon, 
undertaken to generate the income that will service and repay that bor-
rowing, with Keynesians, new Keynesians and post- Keynesians dissenting 
only to highlight the uncertainty that surrounds future income. It is pre-
cisely that uncertainty that makes lending against future income the most 
hazardous kind of lending, so that for 200 years and more banks have 
preferred to lend against collateral. However, collateralized lending is 
vulnerable to asset inflation, leading to lending against prospective capital 
gains. In a book criticizing the quantity theory of money, a book that was 
roundly condemned by Keynes, who refused thereafter to publish his work 
in the Economic Journal, John Atkinson Hobson recognized collateralized 
lending against financial assets as a key source of credit expansion and 
pointed to the inflationary potential of the equity market in this regard 
(Hobson, 1913: 89–92). Hobson did not foresee that when those gains fail 
to materalize, debt becomes excessive in the sense that it can only be serv-
iced through the sale of assets, or reduced expenditure. This is how asset 
inflation creates excess debt, which in turn creates deflation in the form of 
falling prices and demand.
As indicated in the first part of this chapter, the systems of general equi-
librium that are commonly used to analyse asset markets routinely ignore 
the market process that actually occurs in such markets. Those markets 
do not fix prices that make supply equal to demand, except in a notional 
sense. Financial markets typically operate for extended periods of disequi-
librium, itself the counterpart of the structural disequilibrium of the real 
economy that they are accommodating. When the demand for financial 
securities exceeds the amount of money that holders and issuers of those 
securities are prepared to take out of the market, prices rise. As prices rise, 
demand for those assets, far from falling off, is enhanced by a speculative 
demand for assets to benefit from capital gains. However, not all securities 
are equal, and prices of securities do not rise equally. Short- term securi-
ties and bonds usually have the price at which they are repaid written into 
the terms of the bond. As the date of their repayment approaches, their 
market price converges on their repayment price. The market price of such 
bonds will only exceed that repayment price by a small margin, reflecting 
any differences between the interest payable on such a bond and the inter-
est payable on equivalent new issues. Excess demand for new securities 
will therefore inflate most of all equities (common stocks) that do not have 
any fixed repayment value.
The majority of securities are issued by financial intermediaries and 
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bought by other financial intermediaries. This issue therefore does not 
constitute any net expansion of credit, or of the balance sheets of non-
 financial businesses, such as would take out of the markets any excess net 
inflow of money into those markets. The non- financial sectors that do take 
money out of the markets are governments and corporations. The finance 
that governments take out of the markets is limited by their fiscal position 
(the balance between government income and expenditure). An excess 
demand for securities, such as was set off by the inauguration of funded 
pension schemes in the UK and the USA therefore impacts most directly 
on the balance- sheet operations of corporations. During the 1980s, corpo-
rations that issued securities in the capital markets found that they could 
issue shares cheaply. In large part this is because the return on shares is 
not just in the form of dividends paid out of company profits, but also in 
the form of capital gains, which are not paid by the company but by other 
buyers in the market for the shares.
As a result of the excess demand for shares, corporations have issued 
capital in excess of what they need to finance their commercial and indus-
trial operations. In the past, the overcapitalization of companies might 
have been avoided because it would have involved the ‘watering down’ of 
profits (sharing a given amount of profits among more shareholders), or 
loss of control by the directors of a company who could no longer control 
the majority of shares at a company general meeting. However, today’s 
shareholders are mostly institutions whose large diversified portfolios 
are subcontracted to professional fund managers and rated on financial 
returns, rather than on their interventions in the running of companies. 
Those financial returns include the appreciation of the value of stocks 
through financial inflation, a return that is paid by other participants in 
the market, rather than by the issuer of the securities. By and large fund 
managers have too many diverse holdings to take any other than a finan-
cial interest in a company. At the same time, new techniques of senior 
management remuneration have tended to replace profit- related pay with 
share- price- related pay, through stock options. Along with new techniques 
of debt management, stock option remuneration has removed inhibitions 
about the overcapitalization of companies.
Excess capital has been used to replace bank borrowing with cheaper 
long- term capital. Replacing borrowing with shares also has the advan-
tage that pre- tax profits can be made to rise by the reduction in interest 
cost. Where excess capital has not been used to reduce debt, it has been 
used to buy short- term financial assets. Alternatively, excess capital is 
committed to buying and selling companies. Hence the extended festival 
of merger and takeover activity and balance- sheet restructuring that has 
characterized corporate finance since the 1980s.
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The overall effect on banks of company overcapitalization has been to 
make them more fragile. Before the 1970s, the largest, most reliable bor-
rowers from banks were large corporations. From the end of the 1970s, 
such corporations found that they could borrow much more cheaply by 
issuing their own bills (company paper) or directly from the interbank 
market. If banks want to hold company loans, they have to buy them in 
the market at yields that give banks no profit over their cost of funds in 
the capital or money markets. The loss of their best customers has turned 
banks towards fee- related business in derivatives and debt obligations 
markets, and towards lending into the property market and to other risky 
customers that banks had hitherto treated with much more caution. The 
overall effect, from the savings and loans scandals of the early 1980s, to 
the subprime market crisis since 2007, has clearly been to make banking 
markets much more prone to crisis.
This capital market inflation is behind the long equity financing boom 
since the 1970s. In the housing market, the deregulation of housing credit 
since the 1980s has increased the amount of credit entering the housing 
market, driving up house prices. In a sense, this is the paradigmatic 
example of asset inflation with collateralized lending. The more house 
prices rise, the more credit comes into the market because housing is a 
necessity, and the prospects of capital gains may be set against the costs 
of greater indebtedness. Indeed, as house prices rise, the housing market 
becomes more liquid and more capital gains can be realized to reduce the 
debt induced by the inflation of housing assets (Toporowski, 2009; see also 
below).
Furthermore, asset inflation improves the quality of loan collateral, not 
only by making that collateral more liquid, but also by increasing its value, 
so that the margin between the loan and the asset value increases. With 
competitive lending and turnover in the housing market, the prospective 
capital gain on housing collateral comes to be incorporated into the loan. 
Whereas at the start of the housing boom, during the 1980s, house pur-
chasers were offered typically 80 per cent of the value of the property as 
a mortgage loan, in the 1990s they could obtain 100 per cent mortgages. 
Three years ago, borrowers in the UK were being offered 120 per cent 
mortgages.
Unlike the Bernanke–Gertler financial accelerator model, this asset 
inflation was clearly a disequilibrium process. (The determining variable 
of the financial accelerator is a fluctuating net worth of economic agents, 
whereas in this analysis it is an unconstrained rise in asset values.) But 
asset inflation had two stabilizing features which put off the Minskyan 
crisis until 2008. The first was the overcapitalization of large non- financial 
companies: excess capital held in the form of liquid assets makes those 
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companies more financially stable and capable of surviving a longer period 
of negative cash flow. The other stabilizer was the support for consump-
tion expenditure from a debt- inflated housing market, whose capital gains 
could be extracted by the greater liquidity of that market. The use of 
capital gains for consumption reduced household saving and made firms’ 
investment a more effective generator of cash flow for the business sector 
(Toporowski, 2009). Rising asset values thus hedged speculative and Ponzi 
financing structures with capital gains.
The financial crisis results from the breakdown of these two stabilizers. 
In the capital market the emergence of debt- financed private equity funds, 
which bought out companies, transferred those funds debt onto the com-
panies’ balance sheets in order to resell the companies (and debts), and 
transformed the process of capital market inflation. The trend towards 
equity financing was now converted into a process of converting the 
debts used to inflate the equity market into company debt. (In his exhaus-
tive analysis of the 1929 Crash, Schumpeter (1939: 877) had noted ‘the 
ominous increase in the flotations of securities of investment trusts and 
financial and trading companies since 1926 . . . ’.) In the housing market, 
there was clearly a limit to which young people, at the start of their careers, 
could indebt themselves, even with the prospect of capital gains in their 
later middle age. It is significant that the housing boom broke not where 
houses were most expensive, where capital gains may be said to have been 
the greatest, and hence where a speculative ‘bubble’ may have been most 
distended. The boom broke where incomes were lowest, in the subprime 
sector of the market, where the market in the asset was least liquid, and 
therefore excessive debt could be serviced only out of a low and unreliable 
income, rather than out of capital gain.
With a reduction in the credit entering the capital and housing markets, 
relative to the credit being taken out of those markets, asset inflation 
reverts to asset deflation. Collateralized lending now chokes off the supply 
of credit even further. The proportion of housing value that mortgage 
lenders in the UK will advance has, in recent months, reduced to between 
60 per cent and 75 per cent. This obliges purchasers to put more of their 
own money into house purchase. The higher deposit requirement has 
reduced the number of borrowers capable of meeting the standard for 
prudent collateralized lending. Moreover, with falling asset values, home-
owners find that the excess of collateral value over outstanding loan value 
disappears, and may even become negative. Debt that previously could be 
written off against capital gain must now be paid out of income.
In the company sector, the equivalent process involves reducing firms’ 
investment, which then reduces the cash inflow of the firm sector as a 
whole. In both sectors a reluctance to borrow is accompanied by an 
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increased desire to repay debt. Contrary to official opinion, the reduced 
lending of banks is not because banks are unwilling to lend, but because 
their customers are unwilling to borrow. In terms of Minsky’s financing 
structures, financing obligations previously hedged by capital gains are 
made speculative by the fall in asset values, and speculative structures 
are turned into Ponzi financing structures when income and asset values 
cannot generate sufficient cash flow to settle financing obligations.
Throughout the process of asset inflation and the subsequent deflation, 
companies, households and banks are behaving rationally and prudently 
in terms of what their recent experience tells them about their prospects. 
The problem lies in the mutually reinforcing combination of asset inflation 
and collateralized lending, inducing over- indebtedness in the economy. 
Modern finance theory presents borrowing as a financing activity to gener-
ate future income which is then supposed to service that borrowing. From 
this is derived the economic function of the rate of interest in neoclassical, 
Keynesian, new Keynesian, new classical and even many post- Keynesian 
theories, as a regulator of business investment. However, in speculative 
markets it ceases to have that function. More importantly, as long as 
asset inflation continues, asset markets remain liquid, allowing the build-
 up of collateralized debt. Contrary to Minsky, Fisher, Kindleberger and 
their followers, it is not business investment that causes company over-
 indebtedness. As recently as 2006, around 90 per cent of non- financial 
business investment in the USA was financed from retained profits. 
Companies succumb to excess debt through asset inflation and the inter-
vention of investment funds and private equity funds in the capital market 
inflation process. Such firma operate by issuing equity and then leveraging 
it up with additional borrowing that is then transferred as a dept liability 
onto the balance sheet of companies bought by the funds.
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND ASSET INFLATION
In the discussion on the financial crisis, one important factor has been 
overlooked, namely the distribution of income and wealth. It is obvious 
that the social consequences of the financial crisis have been made much 
more painful by the growing inequalities of income and wealth in the USA 
and the UK. But there are also connections between such inequalities and 
financial instability. These have been highlighted by many critics of finan-
cialized capitalism. For example, Hobson argued that inequalities of wealth 
and income gave rise to oversaving, and hence economic stagnation. More 
recently, the late John Kenneth Galbraith noted the connection between 
tax cuts for the rich and asset inflation (Galbraith, 1988: Foreword).
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Asset inflation and income and economic inequalities are intimately 
linked. When the asset is housing, its inflation is especially pernicious. The 
housing market then redistributes income and wealth, from young people 
earning less at the start of their careers and indebting themselves hugely 
in order to get somewhere decent to live to people enjoying highest earn-
ings at the end of their careers. But housing inflation is also like a pyramid 
banking scheme because it requires more and more credit to be put into 
the housing market in order to allow those profiting from house inflation 
to realize their profits.
Nevertheless, even those entering the system with large debts hope to 
be able to profit from it. Such has been the dependence of recent govern-
ments and society in general on asset inflation that the political consensus 
is ‘intensely relaxed’ about such regressive redistribution of income. That 
consensus has encouraged the belief that the best that young people can 
do to enhance their prospects is to indebt themselves in order to ‘get on the 
property ladder’, i.e. enrich themselves (or at least improve their housing) 
through housing inflation.
Those at the bottom of the income distribution inevitably suffer most 
from rising house prices because, living in the worst housing, they have the 
least possibility to accommodate their house purchase to their income by 
buying cheaper, smaller housing. Because households in this social group 
have little other option but to over- indebt themselves in order to secure 
their housing, default rates among them are also most likely to rise with 
house price inflation. This inequality lies behind the problems in the sub-
prime market in the USA and the equivalents of that market in the UK and 
elsewhere. Paradoxically, a more equal distribution of income and wealth is 
more likely to keep the housing market in equilibrium, because any increase 
in house prices above the rate of increase in income and wealth is more 
likely to result in a fall in demand for housing. Where income and wealth are 
already unequally distributed, and house prices rise faster than incomes, a 
fall in demand from those who can no longer afford a given class of housing 
is offset by the increased demand for that class of housing among house-
holds that previously could afford better housing. In this way, the redistri-
bution of income and wealth from those with more modest incomes to those 
with higher incomes also facilitates asset inflation in the housing market.
Thus asset inflation has increased inequalities of wealth and income, 
and those inequalities have further fed that inflation. Such inflation is 
therefore a self- reinforcing pathology of financial markets and society, 
rather than, as the economics establishment tells us, a temporary disequi-
librium (a ‘bubble’) in the markets. Financial stability rests not only on 
sound banking and financial institutions; it also requires a much more 
equal distribution of income and wealth.
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CONCLUSION
The present financial crisis is not the result of euphoria, followed by panic and 
a rush to sell, but the outcome of asset inflation in the dual price system that 
Minsky took over from Irving Fisher, in a setting of collateralized lending. 
Measures to stabilize asset values are an essential element in financial recon-
struction. Furthermore, financial reconstruction must deal with more than 
just the stability of the banking system, or the broader financial system. 
Here it needs to be recognized that one of the functions of financial inter-
mediation is to absorb risks that arise in the course of business. Stabilizing 
a banking system without stabilizing the economy makes any regulated 
financial system vulnerable to arguments from bankers and economists that 
if only the regulations were made lighter, or preferably removed altogether, 
the credit system would automatically alleviate those imbalances, and bring 
the economy back to equilibrium. And who then would argue against them, 
since we all teach our students that the credit system functions to accom-
modate economic imbalances and has done so quite effectively for decades, 
with only recent disastrous results. The radical conclusion of Minsky’s work 
remains that without stabilizing the economy at large, banking stabilization 
is unlikely to hold. To this must be added recognition that the inequalities of 
income and wealth that have scarred the most financialized economies are 
not incidental to asset inflation, but are a part of its pathology.
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